Task Forces

14.08.2019.

Political philosophy of Islamic identity in Turkic Persian and Arab World in classical and postmodern era

Dr Kemal YILDRIM

 

 

 

 

Abstract

Main goal of this paper  is  to review  Political ,cultural and social aspects  of Islaimc Ideology in terms of its historical context and influence on their environment where they  arose.and also to examine a number of other elements such as political entities aiming to build an Islamic shar’ia based government in countries where they are involved.

The Government’s relations both at  local base and their interactions with such organizations either vis-a-vis or underground will be analyzed .l also try to indicate how Islam spread rapidly from its birthplace in Arabia. In part its spread was due to jihad ('holy war' ) so all these Muslim Organizations arising in Turkic, Persian and Arab world shape the governments with their  direct or indrect political interactions  based on their philosophy though slightly differs a bit among all those sects arose .

 

Keywords : Islam, Politics,Iran , Turkey, Arab World

 

Introduction

I wish to express certain hints on a balanced comparison between Islamic and other views in the field of polity and form of government l would therefore review of the important issues in the philosophy of politics, and on every issue find out what is the view of Islam, comparing it with the other views. I therefore intend to  make a detailed investigation of the basic differences between them. And, I, will focus on  some issues to explain the views of Islam pertaining to them in order that it may be possible to make such comparisons.To me it is  therefore important also to indicate “What Do Muslims believe ?” As known , Like Jews and Christians, Muslims are considered to be monotheists.l would also argue  a (Scholastic theology); which is called Ilm-al-Kalam in Islamic literaturistic terminology By  professing it were called Mutakallamin. I.e The Differences between Kalam and Falsafa” Since Aristotle also attempted to demonstrate the unity of God; but his view that matter was eternal implied that God could not be the Creator of the world which is still discussable through different divinitiy approaches .

Regarding the early and classical philosopy of Islamizm I would approach first, towards the revelation of Muhammad, and second, the absence of Aristotle's Politics, whether by intention or historical circumstance, from the canon of texts translated from Greek and Syriac in ninth-century Baghdad.

I  would also talk about the Later schools of Islamic philosophy, such as those founded by Ibn Arabi, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra, are of particular importance, as they are still active in the Islamic world.and their contribution to Falsafa as muslim scholars.

This research will consider islamic Identity both in Turkey, Iran and and and Arab World so l would emphasize to indicate the political roles of dominant religious thoughts  and ritual activity shaped by the different Islamic  orders,

 Qur’an forms an important aspect of the belief of the Muslims all over the World and the basic principle is a revelation between the God and his messnger Prophet Muhammad and its usually filled with sunnah i.e basic common and usages as welkl as special  words and deeds quoted by Muhammad

Qur’an does not reject neith Judaism or christianity The only differerence is that Muslim’s belief is accepted as Protestant doctrine since it rejects Judaist and christian doctrines by some of the Judaist scholars The main reason to reject christian doctrines is just because Jesus was GOD and that GOD is three different persons (Father ‘s son and holy spirit) Because Muslims in principle believe that Jesus was a prophet and that God is one.Arabian geography was one of among other parts of the World that much spreads Islamic ideology However according to a number of sources from muslim scholars they allowed both christians and jews to practice their religion on the basis they pay only of their taxes contributing the Treasury of the Islamic entity.Most of the Works of Both Plato and Aristotle were translated by mainly Arab christians during A.D 800 and then later by Jewish scholars contributed towards translations.

Muslim scholars mainly were all about Plato, with influence also from Aristotle's Ethics;I think , Most of the muslim scholars  were not really well aware of Aristotle's Politics but many others perhaps were. Meanwhile Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies were combined by Greek Neo- Platonists.

Although we clearly do not know how much they were affected by thgis combination but Islamic philosophy more or less becomes Platonized Aristotelianism.

We should have a detailed investigation of the basic differences between east and West . I think , we will now need to review some important hints  to explain the views of Islam pertaining to them so that a comparision thus may be finalized  

The first issue is the importance of social life. Islam, like the other schools of thought, emphasizes social life. But more than this it considers it a duty to attend to social problems and to struggle for the benefit of all human beings. Being indifferent to such problems is considered in Islam to be a grave sin. This attention is so important that it sometimes becomes necessary to spend all of one’s property and even to endanger one’s own life to save others from worldly and other-worldly afflictions and harms, from going astray and from spiritual corruption, and from misfortune in the next life. It is unlikely that any school of thought other than Islam has advanced this idea so far. Of course, we believe that none of the heavenly religions have any disagreement on basic principles and rules. Naturally, they hold this view in common with Islam.

 The second issue is the necessity of law for social life, since no society can survive without rules and social regulations, for otherwise it would soon succumb to chaos, deterioration and destruction. The view of Islam on this matter is also clear and does not Stand in need of an explanation. We may therefore  need to focus on  two elements . The first point is that from the perspective of Islam, the goal of law is not only to bring about social order and discipline, but beyond this to maintain social justice; because, firstly, without justice the order would not be durable and the masses of the people would not tolerate injustice and oppression for ever; and secondly, in a society not governed by justice most people would not have the opportunity for desired growth and development and hence, the goal of man’s creation and social life would not be realized. According to most modernist muslim philosophers

  

Another point is that, from the Islamic viewpoint, social laws should be such as to prepare the ground and context for the spiritual growth and eternal felicity of the people. At the very least they should not be inconsistent with spiritual development, for, in the view of Islam, the life of this world is but a passing phase of the entire human life which despite its short duration, has a fundamental role in human destiny. That is, it is in this phase that with his conscious behaviour the human being should prepare for himself his everlasting felicity or wretchedness. Even if a law could maintain the social order in this world but would cause eternal misfortune for humans, from this Islamic view it would not be a desirable law, even if it were to be accepted by the majority.

 

The third issue is how and by whom the law should be legislated. The accepted theory in most current societies is that the laws should be legislated and approved by the people themselves or their representatives. Since the consensus of all the people or of their representatives is practically impossible, the view of the majority (even if merely half plus one) is the criteria for the validity of the law.

 

This theory, first of all, is based on the idea that the goal of law is to satisfy the people’s needs, not to provide that which would truly benefit them. Secondly, since it is impossible to have unanimous agreement, we should suffice with the opinion of the majority. However, the first idea mentioned is not accepted by Islam, for many people wish to satisfy their bestial instincts and temporary lusts without thinking of their disastrous consequences.

 

Usually the number of such people is at least one half plus one, so the social laws would be dictated by the desires of such people. 

 

I am not sure but l guess It would be  obvious that the schools which believe in a goal beyond animal lust and base desire will not be able to connribute towards this idea.

 

With regard to the second idea, that is, the validity of the vote of the majority in the absence of unanimity, it should be said that only in absence of a deciding divine and intellectual criterion can the majority be the criterion for preferring an opinion. However, in the Islamic system there do exist such divine and intellectual criteria. In addition, usually a powerful minority, by using the facilities for widespread propaganda, has an important role in channelling the thoughts and beliefs of others, and in fact what is approved is only the desire of a limited but powerful minority, not the true desire of the majority or of all the people. Furthermore, if the criterion is that the people’s choice would be valid for themselves, why shouldn’t we also accept the choice of a minority as valid for itself, even if it would result in a type of autonomy? In this case, what would be the logical justification for governments to oppose the wishes of some social groups which they rule by force?!

  

From the perspective of Islam with regard to this problem, laws should be legislated in such a way that they procure the benefits of the members of the society, particularly of those who desire to improve themselves and to gain eternal felicity. It might be  obvious that such law should be legislated by one who has enough knowledge about the real and eternal benefits of humans, and, secondly, who does not sacrifice the benefits of others for his personal interests and vain desires. Again It is likely to be obvious that there is no one wiser than Almighty God, Who has no need of His servants or their works, and Who has provided divine legislation only for the sake of benefitting them. Certainly, the social laws described in the heavenly revealed books do not explicitly state all the social rules which are necessary for every time and place, but religious law does provide a general framework for the derivation of regulations necessary for changing conditions of time and place, and, at least by observing the limits delineated by this framework it may be possible to avoid falling into the deadly valley of eternal perdition.

  

The fourth issue is that of who should enforce social law. Islam, like most other political schools, requires the existence of a State as a power which is able to prevent violations of the law, and the lack of the State is equivalent to the suspension of law, chaos, and the violation of the rights of the weak.

 

It is likely that there are two fundamental qualifications for administrators of the law, particularly for the one at the top of the pyramid of power: first, sufficient knowledge of the law in order to prevent infringement of it due to ignorance; and second, self-control over his desires in order to prevent the intentional misapplication of the law. Other qualifications, like administrative acumen, courage, and so on, can be considered as supplementary requirements. Naturally, the ideal is that the administrator of the law should generally be without ignorance, selfishness, and other vices, and such a person is one who, in religious terminology, is called ma’sum (infallible). All Muslims believe in the infallibility of the Prophet, and the Shi’ites also believe in the infallibility of the Imams,  In the absence of an infallible one, these criteria should be observed, to the extent possible, for the selection of the leader as well as for lower positions in the official hierarchy in a proportionate manner.

 

Basically, the basis of the thesis of Wiláyat-e faqih (lit., guardianship of the jurisprudent meeting all the requisite requirements) is the proposition that a person who is nearer to the station of infallibility should occupy the position of the infallible one, i.e. on top of the pyramid of power, in order that this position may be occupied by one with the best knowledge of the precepts and laws and their fundamental bases, one who has the most piety and self-control. By means of these two basic qualifications (jurisprudence and piety) it is at least possible that he will be less likely intentionally or unintentionally to transgress against the law of Islam.

  

Another point which may be raised here is that from an Islamic perspective no human has any intrinsic right to rule over another, even if he issues valid and just decrees, for all people, like other creatures, have been created and are the property of Almighty God, and no one may interfere with another’s property without his permission. A human being has no right even to use his own bodily parts in a manner contrary to God’s will and consequently he cannot allow others to do so. Hence, the only one Who Himself has an absolute right to govern and to depose of anyone and anything is Almighty God. Every authority and wiláyah should be from Him or at least with His sanction. It is obvious that Almighty God would never permit anyone to execute the law without having the necessary knowledge of His laws, or without there being a guarantee of the correctness of his deeds and obedience to the divine laws, or without piety and the necessary moral qualifications.

  

On the other hand, we know that except for the prophets and their selected successors, no one else was specifically designated by Almighty God to execute the law and to govern. So, people must try to find persons who resemble the prophets and the Ma’súmún (infallible ones) as closely as possible. It seems that the best way is first to select committed experts of religion (pious jurists), and then to allow them to select from among themselves the best one, for the experts may more correctly identify the best.

    

It looks clear that the political features of Islam derive from the basic elements of the world view of Islam and its view of man. For instance , the emphasis on the just character of law and its harmony with human spiritual development derives from the view that God Almighty created all mankind in order that people may follow the way of development toward nearness to . God and eternal felicity by their meritorious conduct in life. The right of all humans to happiness and the enjoyment of the blessings of this world exists in order that all may advance on the way of their development in a better and speedier manner. The legislation of the divine laws and religious principles, whether they apply to the individual or society, is for determining the basic outlines of this path. The conditions of expertise in law and piety, in addition to other necessary administrative qualifications, is for securing the necessary conditions for the general development of the people, for reaching eternal felicity and for preventing intentional and unintentional deviation from the correct way of social life.

 

It is likely to make sure l believe that Most believers  are satisfied  that God Almighty will grant all of them  a kind of  opportunity to thank Him for all His blessings, and for the blessing of His law and guidance toward the life of felicity which believers  seek so that believers feel themselves thus at safe .

The main fact is that Political philosophy in Islam is the application of Greek political theorizing upon an understanding of Muhammad's revelation as legislative in intent. In lieu of Aristotle's Politics, unknown in medieval Islam, Plato's political philosophy assumed the primary role in an explanation of the nature and purpose of the Islamic state. Al-Farabi conceived of the prophet as a latter day philosopher-king, Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl took their cue from Socrates' fate and cautioned the philosopher against the possibility of successfully engaging in a philosophical mission to the vulgar masses, and Ibn Rushd presented philosophy as a duty enjoined by the law upon those able to philosophize.

Islamic philosophy, as the name implies, refers to philosophical activity within the Islamic milieu. The main sources of classical or early Islamic philosophy are the religion of Islam itself (especially ideas derived and interpreted from the Quran); Greek philosophy which the early Muslims inherited as a result of conquests when Alexandria, Syria and Jundishapur came under Muslim rule; and pre-Islamic Iranian and Indian philosophy. Many of the early philosophical debates centered around reconciling religion and reason as exemplified by Greek philosophy.

Islamic variance  in Modernism

To some extent l also believe that The truth  is that the Muslim world has been on a breathtaking roller-coaster ride across a tumultuous century. This path  of political Islam may provide us various signs  of them  either in conflict or in contradiction of genuine evolution within  trajectories that include greater realism, political development, and an ability to learn from experience and reality. Perhaps It may also offer us some negative indicators as well. For instance, Political Islam in all its forms represents the unconvinced genesis of a vital process in which Islamic concept  comes to terms with poly  aspects of Western political ideas and institutions, expanding the range of its own sight and activities—in both disturbing and heartening directions. The procedures in historical terms may remain rising in a way , but it represents nothing less than the beginning of an sophisticated reformation in Islamic thought. The first sequence of body blows to the Muslim world in the nineteenth century was delivered by the West. The dawn of the twentieth century began with religious Muslim curiosities  over the fatefull  weakness of the Muslim world, may generate  such philosophers as Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abdu, Rashid Ridha, and Said Nursi Bediüzzaman, who explored  ways to reverse this course of Muslim decline through examination of disability  in Islamic intellectual practice itself. It all looks that seminal events are dramatic then.

We observe that twentieth century has been the stage of numerous ‘revolutions’ in the name of the people or the nation or Islam,Meanwhile Martin Kramer, in which he contends that it could well be argued that Muslims have failed to resolve issues which appeared on their agenda [even] a century ago.”  To me Kramer might be quite right that the Muslim world has not really resolved a whole set of key problems well known to any observer of the region.

To some extent It may be  incorrect to suggest that political Islam and the Muslim world have not gone anywhere in the last century beyond a lot of noise and heat. Indeed, the list of important changes we observe It represents a dramatic evolution—some of it admittedly perhaps negative—even if it does not necessarily involve “resolution” of problems. This evolution sets the indispensable groundwork for the possibility of greater movement toward “resolution” of political problems in this next century.  As a generational change effecting encouraging indicator  . Most people  are already witnessing signs of an early shift toward greater openness, accessibility, and flexibility on the part of new leadership in several states such as Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Bahrain, Syria—and a great deal more change should come as multiple presidents for-life and aged monarchs depart the scene, peacefully or violently. Even where the change is not dramatic, it is perceptible and newer rulers can’t quite get away with what the old ones did. Generational change, of course, occurs not only among rulers but at the level of citizenry as well—new generations who have been socialized into both Islam and western democratic ideas, at least from afar, and many millions more educated in the West—all now regularly exposed to international media and the events of the world. They are increasingly seeking to reconcile, meld, and integrate into new forms of political discourse and practice. It will not be business as usual in the Muslim world in the coming decades. But how do Islamists actually function in this world? Are Muslim concerns markedly different, bound to a unique cultural world? Or are Islamists actually participating in the broader issues of the developing world?[1]

 

Political philosophy of Islam  in classical  era

Believer’s central thought of salvation in Islam is likely to be their core substructure. Because Islamic political theory covers an extensive  diffusion that gathers  under its rubric at least two different trends : A probable holistic  approach that gives particular emphsis  both the integration of religion and politics, and an approach that demand  on their separation forecefully .

Defenders  of the first approach looks in a way that they joined together politically for a common action  in their will  for the “Islamization of wisdom ” meaning that the epistemological foundation of insight  and explanation in all fields  of life, including all areas of political life, must be “ related to Islamic ideology .” so that , one needs to speak of an “Islamic anthropology,” an “Islamic sociology,” an “Islamic political science,” and so on. But there is also a  variation  that one may make among defenders  of this first approach. More or less , one can express  about many, perhaps most, defenders  of the first approach that they feel a necessity  to apply Islamic rule  throughout all coliseum of society.

Kalam & Falsafa

jtihad (“to endeavor” or “to exert effort”) was a method of discourse used in Islam before the second century to develop legal or doctrinal solutions, based on the Q’uran and the Hadith, to new problems as they arose. Since it generally took the form of individual opinion (ra'y), ijtihad gave rise to a wealth of conflicting and chaotic opinions, and was replaced in the second century by a formal procedure of deduction based on the texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith, called qiyas (reasoning by strict analogy). Certain outstanding Muslim thinkers, such as al-Ghazali (died 1111 C.E.) continued to claim the right to use ijtihad. Independent minds exploiting the methods of ijtihad sought to investigate the doctrines of the Qur'an, which until then had been accepted in faith on the authority of divine revelation. One of first debates was that between partisan of the Qadar (Arabic: Qadara, to have power), who affirmed free will, and the Jabarites (jabar, force, constraint), who maintained the belief in fatalism. At the second century of the Hijra, a new movement arose in the theological school of Basra, Iraq. A pupil, Wasil ibn Ata, who was expelled from the school because his answers were contrary to then-orthodox Islamic tradition, became the leader of a new school, and systematized the radical opinions of preceding sects, particularly those of the Qadarites. This new school was called Mutazilite (“Muʿtazilah” ( al-mu`tazilah) (from i'tazala, to separate oneself, to dissent). Its principal dogmas were three:To believers in Islam , God is an absolute unity, and no attribute can be ascribed to Him. Man is a free agent. (It is on account of these two principles that the Mu'tazilites designated themselves the "Partisans of Justice and Unity.") All knowledge necessary for the salvation of man emanates from his reason; humans were able to acquire knowledge before, as well as after, the existence of Revelation, solely by the light of reason. This fact makes knowledge obligatory upon all men, at all times, and in all places.

The Mutazilites, compelled to defend their principles against the orthodox Islam of their day, looked for support in philosophy, and were among the first to pursue a rational theology called Ilm-al-Kalam (Scholastic theology); those professing it were called Mutakallamin. This appellation became the common name for anyone seeking philosophical demonstration in confirmation of religious principles. The first Mutakallamin had to debate both the orthodox Muslims and the non-Muslims, and they may be described as occupying the middle ground between those two parties. But subsequent generations were, to a large extent, critical towards the Mutazilite school, especially after formation of the Asharite concepts.

The Ash'ari theology was instrumental in drastically changing the direction of Islamic theology, separating its development radically from that of theology in the Christian world. In contrast to the Mutazilite school of theologians, the Asharite view was that comprehension of the unique nature and characteristics of God were beyond human capability, and that, while man had free will, he had no power to create anything. It was a Taqlid-based view which did not assume that human reason could discern morality.

Main protagonists of Falsafa and their critics

The twelfth century saw the apotheosis of pure philosophy and the decline of the Kalam, which, attacked by both the philosophers and the orthodox, gradually perished. This supreme exaltation of philosophy may be attributed, in a sense, to two opponents of philosophy, the Sufi mystic theologian Al-Ghazali (1005-1111) among the Persians, and the poet Judah ha-Levi (1140) among the Jews. Ghazali wrote Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Destruction of the Philosophers), an attack on philosophers, asserting that philosophy had no role in the discovery of truth. This work produced a reaction favorable to philosophy, including a refutation by Ibn Rushdi, inducing the philosophers to make their theories clearer and their logic more consistent. The influence of this reaction brought forth the two greatest philosophers of the Islamic Peripatetic school, Ibn Bajjah (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), both of whom undertook the defense of philosophy.

The Jewish poet, Judah ha-Levi, also seeking to free his religion from what he saw as the shackles of speculative philosophy, wrote the "Kuzari," in which he sought to discredit all schools of philosophy. He censured the Mutakallamin severely for seeking to support religion by philosophy, saying, "I consider him to have attained the highest degree of perfection who is convinced of religious truths without having scrutinized them and reasoned over them" ("Kuzari," v.). He reduced the chief propositions of the Mutakallamin, to prove the unity of God, to ten in number, describing them at length, and concluding in these terms: "Does the Kalam give us more information concerning God and His attributes than the prophet did?" (Ib. iii. and iv.) Judah ha-Levi also opposed Aritotelianism for its preoccupation with details and criticism; Neoplatonism had some appeal to his poetic temperament.

Ibn Rushd (or Ibn Roshd or Averroës), the contemporary of Maimonides, closed the first great philosophical era of the Muslims. The boldness of this great commentator of Aristotle aroused the full fury of the orthodox, who, in their zeal, attacked all philosophers indiscriminately, and had all philosophical writings burned. The theories of Ibn Rushd did not differ fundamentally from those of Ibn Bajjah and Ibn Tufail, who follow the teachings of Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi. Like all Islamic Peripatetics, Ibn Rushd admitted the hypothesis of the intelligence of the spheres and the hypothesis of universal emanation. These hypotheses, in the mind of the Arabic philosophers, did away with the dualism involved in Aristotle's doctrine of pure energy and eternal matter. Ibn Rushd’s ideas on the separation of philosophy and religion, further developed by the Averroist school of philosophy in Europe, were later influential in the development of modern secularism Ibn Rushd is, thus, regarded as the founding father of secular thought in Western Europe.

While Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and other Persian and Muslim philosophers barely touched subjects that encroached on religious dogmas, Ibn Rushd devoted considerable attention to them. He said, "Not only is matter eternal, but form is potentially inherent in matter; otherwise, it were a creation ex nihilo" (Munk, "Mélanges," 444). According to this theory, the existence of this world is not only a possibility, as Ibn Sina declared—in order to make concessions to the orthodox—but is also a necessity.

Driven from the Islamic schools, Islamic philosophy found a refuge with the Jews, who transmitted it to the Christian world. A series of eminent thinkers, such as Ibn Tibbon, Narboni, and Gersonides—joined in translating the Arabic philosophical works into Hebrew and commenting upon them. The works of Ibn Rushd especially became the subject of their study, due in great measure to Maimonides, who, in a letter addressed to his pupil Joseph ben Judah, spoke in the highest terms of Ibn Rushd's commentary.

Some historians and philosophers do not agree with this account, claiming that it is based on Western understanding, and describe this era in a completely different way. Their main objection concerns the influence of different philosophers on Islamic philosophy, especially the comparative importance of eastern intellectuals such as Ibn Sina and of western thinkers such as Ibn Rushd.

Later Islamic philosophy

Later schools of Islamic philosophy, such as those founded by Ibn Arabi, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra, are of particular importance, as they are still active in the Islamic world.such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rushd, Al Ghazali, Ibn Arabi, Ibn Khaldun

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Critics of Modernism and Post Modernism in Islam

 

 Many philosophical movements reject both Modernity and Post Modernity as useful. Some of these are associated with cultural and religious conservatism. They view Post Modernism as an allied movement to Secularism. Post Modernity is seen as a rejection of basic spiritual or natural truths, and the emphasis on material and physical pleasure is explicitly a rejection of inner balance and spirituality. Here, religious conservatives mainly include non-Islamic thinkers as Muslins scholars are yet to focus on Post Modernity and its impacts. However, this criticism sometimes result not merely from a faith in traditional authority but rather from a reasonable belief in the disjunction that objective knowledge must be either obtainable in all domains, or obtainable in no domain. Then from the fact that such domains as physics and chemistry are not seriously taken to be subjective or relative in any meaningful sense by most of Post Modernity; it follows that ethics, politics, and the good life in general are not relative or subjective either. This view has been mentioned by Allan Bloom.[2]

 

Christian writers tend to look at the postmodernist era as ideologically agnostic and replete with moral relativism or situation ethics. Josh McDowell & Bob Hostetler[3] offer the following definition of postmodernism: “A worldview characterized by the belief that truth doesn’t exist in any objective sense but is created rather than discovered. Truth is created by the specific culture and exists only in that culture. Therefore, any system or statement that tries to communicate truth is a power play. It is an effort to dominate other cultures.” One of America’s premier Christian leaders, Dr. James Dobson, sees Post Modernism as a system of thought that negates moral certainty. He says that 'Post Modernism' refers to a philosophy or mindset that rejects the value of rational thought, denies the existence of moral and spiritual absolutes, and affirms the right and power of the individual to invent his or her own 'reality.' This way of thinking is incompatible with the Christian perspective because it denies the existence of a truth that is valid for all people at all times. In other words, it rejects the claims of the Gospel on principle, without even granting it a hearing." Roslyn Wallach Bologh & Leonard Mell (1994) argue that the postmodern theory of language constitutes a form of nominalism that parallels the nominalism of speculative, monetarist capitalism and that postmodernism's understanding of language as a "play of power" corresponds to the political realism of contemporary international relations. This metatheory of postmodernism helps to undermine the development of any rational alternative to contemporary political economy and the current world disorder James Fowler argues that Post Modernity is characterized by the "loss of conviction", and Grenz concurs by saying that Post Modernity is a period of pessimism contrasting with modernity's optimism. Post Modernism is a counter enlightenment philosophy whereas modernism is a pro-enlightenment philosophy

 

Jürgen Habermas argues that without both critical and rational traditions, society cannot value the individual, and that social structures will tend towards totalitarianism. He favors universalism as the fundamental requirement for any rational criticism, and to give it up is to nullify the liberalizing reforms of the previous two centuries.However ,David Foster Wallace argues that the trend towards more and more ironic and referential expression has reached a limit, and that a movement back towards "sincerity" is required. Few also propose that religion can not be ignored completely and hence religion is here to stay and must not be utterly discouraged and opposed. They propose that religion must be accepted as a stakeholder to keep the balance in a Post Modern society  Finally, there are critics of Post Modernism who believe that Post Modernity is a passing, and not a growing, phase in social organization. Bernard Smith (1998) argues that `Post Modernism' is unlikely to survive as a general description of contemporary culture in 21st century. Muslim Thinkers on Modernism and Post Post Modernism S. Irfan Habib (2000) in his article “Reconciling science with Islam in 19th century India” gave an account of two Muslim thinkers. He regarded Syed Ahmad as a re-constructionist who tried to reinterpret the Quran to assimilate modern scientific knowledge. He commented on Afghani as a pragmatist who stood for the cultivation of modern sciences, but did not approve of the aping of the West. He criticized the ulema for the strange divide they had created between Muslim science and European science.

 

Critical Analysis of Consumerism Consumption may be viewed in two ways. The first is concerned with satisfying basic needs, and thus in this sense it can be regarded as ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘legitimate’’; although it is a mundane matter, not related to other-worldly activity. In the second perspective, consumption may be viewed as a matter of gratifying desires and wants through luxury and unnecessary services and goods, that is, consumerism. The first sense can be accepted within most religious boundaries, but the second form of consumption does not appear to have religious legitimacy nor to be ethically convincing, appearing far removed from religion’s serious, significant, profound and lasting messages World Trade Organization (WTO). legalizes the western objective to dilate western supremacy over the third world countries. Even though some interpreted it as a clash of civilization or even clash of religions, but it is not true. After renaissance, religion in west has virtually lost its prominence especially in Western Europe and Scandinavia. More effectively put, it is a clash of classes i.e. rich and poor. Developing countries are denied gains from comparative advantage in agriculture through export subsidies provided by developed countries to their comparatively inefficient agriculture sector. This creates unemployment and poverty in the developing economy. Eventually, a developing country will have to submit itself before the international financial institutions which are able to exert extraordinary influence in the developing economy. Therefore, the role of International Monetary Fund (IMF) , World Bank, WTO and the adaptation of Structural Adjustment Program and Free-Float exchange rate system are all interrelated in their objectives to dilate the supremacy of developed world over developing countries.

 

History does not give us a regular pattern of human struggle towards a just and fair political, social and economic setup as described by Marx. Kant also did not tell when we will be able to say that we are living in an enlightened age. These views of Marx and Kant were more relevant to Europe only. Muslim world provided a socially, economically and politically just system to the world for at least 50 years in the rule of Caliphates. In the period after caliphates too, Muslim world provided most things Kant asked for in an enlightened age. However, one clear difference has to be appreciated between Muslims and Islam. Most of the laws in Christianity were mainly developed by humans themselves like St. Paul. Therefore, when thinkers of 15th century and afterwards criticized the church and the clergy, their criticism was also on religion and it was justified as the Christianity and the Clergy were the one and the same thing. This is not the case with Islam and Muslims. Islam was not invented or created by Muhammad .It was the message of God as was Christianity with the difference that the divinity of Christianity was obscured and later modified by Christians. Islam as a message of God remained pure. However, Muslims as all other human beings have not been and are not perfect in their acts and systems. But, the acts of Muslims can not said to be representative of what Islam is as Islam was not invented by Muslims. Therefore, a distinction is to be made between the Muslims and Islam. Muslims may or maybe acting truly on Islam and hence their actions do not determine what Islam is. When we study the ‘Pure Islam’, we will find that there is not a single thing in Islam that is irrational or unjust. In the following lines, I will just give the brief highlights of Islamic teachings which may or may not be truly present or found in Muslim world as Islam is the word of God and not how Muslims act and lead their lives. The Building Blocks of Islamic Philosophy and Teachings which are viewed as most controversial and misunderstood dare briefly summarized hereunder:

 

The Perspectives on Islamic Identity in Turkey, Iran & Arab World

 

            Political Islam in Turkey , Iraq & Syria ,Lebanon and the Palestine

 

Turkey’s Islamists have not implemented  both  restrictive practices and rules formally because this would still require a major overhaul of the legal system, and they see conservative Islamic movements such as  ISIS , Al Nusra etc as “uncivilized”. But in everyday life social pressure is exercised in more subtle ways and people are intimidated through quiet repression on the street. Erdogan Pro muslim Party Leader of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkıma Partisi – Justice and Development Party )  in governance  believed only he could abolish the ‘infidel / heretic’ social system; that is how the secular state is perceived by political Islamists. But attributing the Islamic transformation of Turkey only to him, would be paying him too generous a compliment.

 

The biggest chasm between left and right in Turkish  politics nowdays  is likely to be only the religion; it all hinges on whether “you are devotional or not.”There have been also cosmetic reforms that binds Erdogan and His Government. Formal law no longer  seems to be implemented with the purpose of delivering justice but rather as a tool to deliver punishments to detractors.thus Law comes  at the top the list of casualties. Government supporters are granted privileges and are above the law, while opponents are meted out the harshest sentences.

 

Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi (AKP) Justice and Development Party (AKP) has transformed Sunni identity into the dominant one in Turkey through religious references. Addressing the west, the Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi (AKP) Justice and Development Party (AKP) claimed that it was waging war on deeply rooted nationalism, but all the while it was spreading a far more insidious ideology. In fact, any scholar who works on Turkey knows that middle eastern style nationalism has always relied on religious pillars  to survive. 

 

In the course of Turkey’s republican history Turks had the best attempts at democracy that could have come out of Islamic countries, despite stumbling, interruptions and the tests of perseverance we had to endure. Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi (AKP) Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been calling this political system the regime of secular elites who think it is their right to govern the republic. Yet political Islamists have been involved in various center-right organizations and parties, and have been the recipients of many privileges - strengthening their presence progressively. For example, some of the staff who have served Erdogan include ministers and high level bureaucrats who have held these positions ever since they became civil servants decades ago.

However, Turkey’s political Islamists were not content with the symbiotic relations they had created with the center-right parties. They worked diligently to take over the host organization and reached managerial positions with a perseverance that is praised and advised in Islam through the act of taqiyya ( a form of religious dissimulation that permits believers to conceal the truth in pursuit of their goals)..

So we have come to this situation. The system that protected social rights and liberties, and was supported by a considerable number of citizens, has been destroyed by an invisible bulldozer, and the political Islamists now claim absolute victory. In their eyes, ‘the infidel, heretic’ secular republic has been defeated. 

The most significant fallout of political Islam is its destruction of secular education.

In 2002, the number of pupils studying and graduating from the imam-hatip schools set up to train clerics was seventy thousand, now their number is one million. This number does not include the pupils who attend schools known as “hidden” cleric schools that are functioning under the guise of  being regular public schools.

According to legal judicial investigation tapes, Bilal Erdoğan has himself stated that the handful of “the remaining pupils in the secular secondary education” have been integrated into the hidden imam-hatip cleric schools “in order for them not to pose a threat to the Islamic regime in the future.

This aim has been achieved by assigning eleven hours of the forty hour week of lessons to Sunni religious education in state schools and prep schools. This is because the future generation cannot be left to the guidance of science; it must be conditioned to collective obedience through religion as the political Islamists demand.

Yet another policy devised by Erdogan’s son has been the creation of a fraudulent demand for imam-hatip cleric schools through mosques and the media. 

Living arrangements outside the prescriptions of the Holy Book are not crimes, but are considered to be sins to be eradicated. For instance, Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi (AKP) Justice and Development Party (AKP) politicians have destroyed as many modern toilets as modern sculptures. Tradition dismisses the comforts of modern life far too easily and readily.

Islamists define the morality of society in terms of woman’s virtue and her relations with the opposite sex. This is why, in their eyes, girls and boys have to be segregated. Boys and girls cannot be on the same school grounds, and this includes university dorms. Students of different gender cannot be taught in the same building prior to university. Most school grounds have been gender-segregated in  the past ten years.

Unfortunately this hidden policy has been implemented surreptitiously and frequently over the past ten years, and is now being implemented openly. Boys are pushed to attend boarding schools, and thus kept away from their families, and girls are being encouraged to marry young and become housewives.

Now that Turkey has gone off the rails from its journey towards modernity, where does that leave them?

The Islamists in Turkey are at the zenith of their power. They can be a difficult partner and even threaten to become an enemy to the west. Indeed, hostility towards the west is part of the conspiracy discourse that is widespread all over the middle east.

Nonetheless there are significant numbers of people in Turkey who are resisting, and who struggle for the survival of civility and modern life. And the outcome of their struggle for survival will have much broader global repercussions than  western policy makers would like to think. I do not think that No one can  imagine a Turkey without its secularists in which  would lead to a Europe that is confined to its continent, and it would turn it into a  complex darker scene  for them in conflict with West .

Not the so-called secular-military elite that governed the country harshly for years, that scorned and yet used the Islamists and thus almost single-handedly guaranteed their reactionary attitudes; not Turkey’s western friends who  pretended not to see the colossal infringements of social liberty; and certainly not the pseudo-intellectuals with their egregious interpretations of the events that legitimised the butchering of secular law in the hope that political Islam will produce democracy.

Those who a decade  ago expected an Islamic reform from Turkey that would serve as a model for the world are, at this point, striving to prevent Turkey from turning into a hostile country model.

Finally  with a sentence from Turkey’s political Islamists: “Those who expect Islam to reform want us to give up their  religion. They  will not rise to the bait of the infidel.” If this is a clear statement of intent, so too is the resolve of those of tem  who intend to resist and struggle in defence of their freedoms and their human rights agenda.

 

When we focus about the  political Islam among the other muslim minorities as Kurds or Mahalmites Sunni Arabs in Turkey as well as The Shabak and the Kakais in Iraq  before we discuss the major people in Islamic geography of Turkey and Mesopotamian region The Shabak and the Kakais minorities in Iraq ,  seem to have mixed freely with the rural population of Anatolia, which at first was still largely Christian, but quickly converted to these folk varieties of Islam. And in fact, at present some of them have such heterodox beliefs that their neighbours do not see them as Muslims at all. There are indications, however, that several of these groups, e.g. the Kakais and the Yezidis, were at first still considered orthodox Sufi tarigats; in other words, the heterodoxy of these groups either increased over time, or came to be stressed more as the mark of a distinct ethnicity.members of these groups consider themselves mainly as Kurds

 

Meanwhile,  we  should beware of treating both simply in terms of a generic ‘resurgence of Islam’: because  there might be differences in common values to both countries with features of these minorities slightly differ from each others also in cultural and religious values  (like a rapid urbanization, the demise of Communism and other secular political doctrines, and neoliberal reforms of the economy, not to mention a prolonged armed conflict between Kurdish nationalists and the respective governments as well as current ), these have had rather different effects. Turkey has rather more of a public sphere, or probably , a Proper structured public sphere exists in different way  , than of Iraq: in the 1990s, more room was created for civilian party politics, privatized mass communication channels, and local charity work. So that, political Islam in Turkey is by and large civilian, especially if we disregard the case of the notorious Kurdish Hizbullah survived also in southeastern of Turkey as a political dynamic used against the separatist Kurds organ the PKK , a shady organization which for years appears to have been largely tolerated, if not actually supported, by the Turkish security apparatus (cf. Dorronsoro 1996, 1999: 129-31). The developments in party politics and the reshaping of the media landscape in the 1990s have allowed a plurality of voices to be heard. Ba‘thist Iraq, by contrast, with its long-standing monopolization of all institutions of civil society and mass communication, has not (or possibly not yet) witnessed the emergence of durable institutions of civil society. Given the Ba‘th’s rigorous ways of dealing with any form of political opposition, it was natural, if not inevitable, that an oppositional Kurdish Islamist movement should emerge as a guerrilla organization. Following the 1991 uprising, The collapse of the strong state apparatus; the ensuing social, political and economic chaos; and the gradual erosion of Kurdish nationalism as a mobilizing force, all created room for Islamist organizations like IMIK and Rabita to gain social and political influence. In contradistinction to the relatively pluralist character of the public sphere and the political domain in Turkey, the threat or use of armed action and violent methods have been more characteristic and effective political strategies in Iraqi Kurdistan, as have ties of patronage and tribal links. Iraq has witnessed the reproduction and strengthening of patronage mechanisms, especially in the face of the radical retreat of the state welfare system from the late 1980s onwards. Almost all Kurdish parties in Iraq tend, or are tempted, to monopolize public debate, or at least to co-opt possible sources of dissent. This seems to be a heritage from the Leninist tradition that identifies party and state, which also informs the Ba‘th’s political practice, but does not originate with it. In Iraq, it seems, Islamist networks are personalized rather than purely doctrinal; ideological differences, like those over the Gulf War or the attitude towards the United States, may not be wholly irrelevant, but they do seem of secondary importance. Turkey has a very diversified, and largely privatized, public sphere, within which all kinds of debates and rivalries are acted out by non-violent means. It also has its own autonomous Islamist networks, which are largely unrelated to those of the Muslim Brotherhood. There have been, and are, some contacts between the different Islamic groups. Afghanistan was one cause that united Sunni muslim activists; more recently, Chechnya has been another. But these isolated, and largely symbolic, causes do not allow us to speak of a unified Sunni internationalist movement. For the most part, the Islamist organizations work within a national framework, and acquire many of the traits that other parties in their respective countries have. They may even have a strongly local character, witness the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, which, following its earlier successes in the entire region, appears to have fallen back on its traditional stronghold, the Halabja area.

 

The current ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Sunni Islamic and Alevi) movements seek to redefne themselves as “Muslims,” “Kurds,” and “Alevis” through the means provided by globalization.

Turkey needs a new social contract. The realization that coexistence depends on shared rules and the recognition of diVerences helped to transform the Turkish citizenry’s conception of Turkey from being the “home” of a speciWc group, particularly Sunni Turks, to being a “hotel” in which each group has its own room and they all have to create the shared rules of coexistence. Consequently, a deep search has developed for a new social contract in Turkey, with the EU being viewed as the facilitator of this new social contract. The founding principles of this contract should include secularism, the rule of law, and recognition of the multicultural nature of Turkey. Both Kurds and Turks and both secularists and Islamic groups need to be involved in this search for a new social.

For Syrian case, Alawites also are seen sometimes as more of a cultural group than a strictly religious one. "Many Alawites nowadays consider themselves outright atheists but are still within the cultural sphere of Alawis and are accepted into the sect and treated like any other Shia Islam is the second big sect of after Sunni Islam, to which about 12% of Syrians adhere to. The majority of these followers are Alawites, as is President Assad. Although the Alawites are a minority in the country, they have held control over almost all aspects of the government since 1971 when the father of Bashar al-Assad took power. The Shiites around the world are mainly supported and funded by Iran, as a counterweight to Saudi Arabia. The Shiites are seen as heretics by many Sunni Islamists, and as such almost all Shias in Syria support the Assad regime, as they (somewhat justifiably) fear a massacre or even a genocide in revenge should the Sunni groups come to power. However the Turkomans main groups have positioned themselves against Assad and ISIS in Syra.Alawites do not consider the Five Pillars of Islam to be obligatory. Culturally distinct from other Muslims, Alawites don’t have mosques, they don’t encourage their women to wear headscarves, and many choose neither to fast during Ramadan nor to pray. Instead, Alawites venerate the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law Ali, for whom they are named, with a zeal which some other Muslim groups have labeled as deification.Hezbollah however is Syria’s crucial role in a geopolitical link which Jordan’s King Abdullah coined the “Shia Crescent,” a notional Shia alliance stretching from Iran to Lebanon. The survival of Assad’s regime remains key to Iran and Hezbollah’s ambitions in the region and they have gone all-in to defend it.

As to case in Lebanon and the Palestine, Hizb'Allah was motivated either by internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and Iranian interests, and mechanisms for the resolution of the hostage-crisis were subject to continuous interaction between Hizb'Allah, Iran, and Syria influenced by internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. The Western responses to the hostage-crisis showed limited effectiveness as the crisis management techniques were poorly adjusted in timing and direction to the actual crisis environment. The origins of Shi'i Islamism in Lebanon go back not to Iran, as is commonly thought, but to Iraq in the 1960s where a Shi'i religio-political revival took place in the "circles of learning" (hawzat al-'ilmiya) in Najaf, led by the charismatic Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr. These circles became the epicenter of Shi'i activism and the home base of the Party of Islamic Call (Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya), which propagated a revivalist message calling for a revolutionary transformation of society among Shi'i communities in Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon.1 Virtually all of Lebanon's major Shi'i leaders came out of this circle in Najaf.2 Although on reaching Lebanon the radical sheikhs established their own circles, they did not develop a revolutionary program patterned after Khomeini's until after two events took place in 1978: the disappearance of the charismatic Imam Musa as-Sadr, an Iranian leader who moved to Lebanon in 1959 and quickly attracted a mass following; and the Khomeini movement in Iran brought Shi'i religious militancy to the cusp of power.

For the Palestine , Two factors have influenced the development of Palestinian identity: Palestinian Diaspora after the 1948 war, coupled with Jordanian and Egyptian rule over the West Bank and Gaza. The dispersion of the larger part of the Palestinian population and the 
presence of almost three million Palestinians in occupied territories today have created different conditions for the evolution of identities. These identities remain somewhat distinct despite the Oslo Agreement that brought the PLO leadership from exile to the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). It was believed that this step would lead to the reconciliation between "interior" and "exterior" political cultures. However, the post¬Oslo period has witnessed competition between various strains of Palestinian political culture, such as that between the mainstream national movement and the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Historically, the Palestine question can be related to the problem of Western intervention - cultural penetration in the form of ideas of nationalism and political penetration in the form of colonial rule. However, while Jewish nationalism originated from the intel1ectual and emotional responses to the pogroms of Eastern Europe and Russia, Arab nationalism was a direct reaction to Ottoman (Turkish) oppression and European colonialism. Along its historic continuum, Palestine became the object of conflicting political claims and intense religious attachments. In time, these played an important part in the development of two separate but conflicting nationalisms: Arab nationalism and Zionism. Both forms of nationalism strove to gain control of Palestine. 

Islamic forces have influenced the politics of Palestinian nationalism throughout its struggle for independence largely by giving it impetus and direction, in confrontation with the Zionists. To cite some examples: the incidents of 1920, the Wailing Wall Incident of 1929, the 1936 Arab Revolt and the role of Izzedin AI-Qassam, the 1948 war, the 1987 Intifada and the role of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the current AI-Aqsa Intifada. Regardless of secular tendencies within the Palestinian national movement, the Islamic dimension has been a potent factor in the struggle for independence. It is no wonder then that the religious aspect, i.e. Islam, has always been a focal point in the Palestinian political debate and discourse, and has acted as the source 0 checks and balances within the Palestinian polity. The complexity of the conditions which triggered the formation of the Islamic movement led Hamas founders to create an equally complex strategy based on pragmatism and realism in adaptation to the political climate. Today, the faltering political peace process gives wider support to the Islamic movement spearheaded by Hamas. It is apparent that a worsening state of affairs arms Hamas with more power, extended from the Palestinian public, to advance its own political agenda within overarching Islamic ideology. 

During the current Intifada, Hamas garners the support of 30 percent of the Palestinian population. Hamas plays an imperative role in catering to Palestinian socioeconomic and medical needs, let alone the fact that it has a noted presence through its military operations against Israel.

 

Middle Eastern societies are not a single monolithic mass of people waiting to discover their cultural essence. They are, instead, complex societies consisting of different ideologies, lifestyles and identities — including different ethnic, religious and cultural identities — with competing interests and objectives. 

I believe that the political experiences of  both Justice and Development Party (AKP)  in  Turkey and the Msulim brotherhood may illustrate us that most of the Islamist parties have not yet completed their evolution from being rigid ideological parties whose overall aim is to rebuild their own communities in their own glance to pragmatic organizations that are likely to be willing to represent and give a voice to their path followers more or less in a more pluralistic political environment.

Islamist movements participate in national politics and democratic elections, although they neither acknowledge the concept of a nation-state based on a homeland nor the governance of democracy. They believe that any Muslim is a part of the umma, the nation of Islam. The difference between that and a union, such as the European Union, is that the latter is still based on nation-states with defined geographic homelands coming together under a unified government. The caliphate state that Islamists believe in is not based on citizenry of those who live in a specific territory or a homeland but one that is based on faith.

 

Nationalism is one of the most important factors in forming or reforming the contemporary nation states, wh~ch constitute the majority of international society. Historically, nationalism served subjectively by unifying small entities and creating large powerful political units. The growth of unifying sentiments of loyalty toward the nation gave the nation state a strength and a coherence that other forms of political organizations had lacked. In addition, "nationalism tends to differentiate beyond the area which it can unify, increasing'the difficulties of conquest by power."

 

Yet colonial powers used nationalism in a negative way when they ditched some parts of the mother state and annexed them to different states, where the ditched population became a minority. In such cases, nationalism created domestic problems because it tended to emphasize the minority's problems in any country. Minority problems, however, did create a domestic instability and, as a, result, produced international instability. However, nationalism and the strengthening of the nation state in the nineteenth century were the main reasons for the "Balance of Power" system in the world. It dominat~d Europe and the international society until the first world war. In spite of the importance of nationalism, the variety of conditions and experiences prevented any single definition from being accepted. Thus, a global united definition is still lacking. Because.of this lack, emphasis usually is centralized on the other points related to nationalism, such as determinant factors, effects, stages, etc. Arab Nationalism Nationalism is a universal concept. It cannot be divided according to regional considerations (Arab, America, British, etc.). In addition, its determinant factors are almost the same. Differences between one region and another occur in areap such as historical development and ranking of the determinant factors. According to Arab nationalism, the determinant factors such as language, history, race, and religion need to be discussed. Historically, Arab nationalism began before the emergence of Islam. The modern Arab nationalism began in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century. some steps taken involved Arab nationalism in practice. However, modern Arab nationalism had three stages of development. The Pan Islam Stage, 1875-1920; the Liberal Nationalism Stage. 1920-1948, and the Radical Nationalism Stage, 1948--, which is still existing. The third and contemporary stage of Arab nationalism was the most effective in producing many social and political changes in the Arab world.

 

The Iranian claims on some parts of the Gulf and sdme times of all the Gulf constituted a threat to Arab nationalism, on one hand, and to the national interest of the emirates, on the other hand. In addition, the Shah's military existence in Oman against Dhaffar~ebellions represented an obvious threat to any liberation movement in the area. Finally, the Shah's plans to convert Iran to police the area represented a heavy stick over the heads of the emirates' rulers and people. Thus, the convenient and effective response to all of these variables was the clinging to Arab nationalism and the achieving of the main principles of Arab unity. The Arab's realization of this nationalistic conflict between Arab nationalism and Persian nationalism emphasized the need for their support of the Gulf emirates. Arabs officially and nonofficia1ly pushed as hard as they could to help those emirates toward an urgent unification as a response to their Arab nationalism. Factors that Supported and Facilitated the Success of the Federation As the UAE was established, Arab nationalism also contributed to the success. Some examples were

 

(a) the Saudi Arabian renunciation of her claims in A1 Buraimi Oasis added to the notable support that Saudi Arabia offered to the UAE, especially in the social and interior aspects.

(b) the Omani renunciation of her claims, such as Al Wagan and Mezyed. In addition, Oman allowed her citizens to be naturalized by the UAE and allowed them to occupy any official

 

To conclude , Islamist regimes have been in power for relatively brief periods of time, making longer range judgments more difficult. In Iran we have two decades of dramatically evolving political experience; Sudan has had only one decade; the Taleban in Afghanistan had barely half a decade. Few regimes of any kind in the Muslim world can demonstrate great signs of success, but they are tolerated in the West as long as their policies are generally not seen as seriously damaging to Western interests.

A core problem is the reality that many U.S. policies are highly unpopular in the Muslim world, and governments that would fully reflect public opinion are likely to adopt a harsher stance toward the United States than current authoritarian regimes that look to American support to stay in power This is the dilemma of democratization in the Muslim world.

 Islamc view of Postmodernizm, The reason lost its hegemony and supra-rational forces came to be accepted. Post-modernism is likely to be characterised by pluralism, be it cultural, religious or literary sphere. Europe and North America became multi-cultural and multi-religious societies due to the migration of people from the western powers' former African and Asian colonies.

Also, it was during this phase that religion also found a respectable place again in western society. In other words, religion came to be re-appropriated. Thus, post-modernism, unlike modernism, is not hegemonic and is tolerant of other cultures; its main characteristic is pluralism. Now let us explore the relation between Islam and post-modernism.

Islam believes in religious and cultural pluralism, and while accepting importance of reason it also accepts supra-rational forces. According to the Quran, Allah has created several religions and cultures though he could have created only one, if He so desired. (548). Thus, pluralism is the very basic to the Quran.

According to the Quran the world has been created in its plurality, not only in matters of religion but also by way of ethnicity, nations and tribes. These have been described as signs of Allah (3022). About national and tribal plurality, one only need see Surah 49, verse 13.

The Quran stresses pluralism to such an extent that even when one is convinced that others' gods are false, it stops believers from abusing them. The Quran says, “And abuse not those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest, exceeding the limits they abuse Allah through ignorance.” Further, it says “Thus to every people have. We made their deeds fair-seeming...” (6109)

Here, it is a Quranic injunction not to say bad words about others' religion(s) because to every people their religion looks true and valid. The Quran even says that in every place of worship Allah is remembered and hence it should be respected. Thus, the Quran says, “And if Allah did not repel some people by others, cloisters and churches and synagogues and mosques in which Allah's name is much remembered, would have been pulled down.” (2240).

Thus, there is no place for inter-religious conflict in Islam. The Quran also subscribes to the doctrine of what Shah Waliullah and Maulana Azad called the wahdat-i-Deen i.e., unity of religion, which means all religions are same in essence and in their core teachings. Both the eminent theologians have thrown detailed light on this question in their respective writings.

As far as multi-culturalism is concerned, the West accepted it only in the latter part of the 20th century. The West had otherwise long been a mono-religious and mono-cultural society, because the Christian churches  had rejected validity of all other religions except Christianity. The church now of course believes in inter-religious dialogue and has issued instructions to Christian organisations to that effect. The Quran had accepted all Biblical prophets during the revelation itself.

Islam accepted multi-culturalism too by saying that all believers are one Ummah regardless of their ethnicity, language, tribe or nationality. It also admonished believers not to discriminate between Arabs and non-Arabs, as Arabs were very proud of their ethnic origin. Islam spread far and wide among peoples of different cultures and even the Shariah respected the 'adat (customs) of different people. Local customs and traditions were integrated with Shariah formulations from the earliest time.

Thus, it will be seen that Islamic teachings anticipated what came to be called post-modernism today. The most essential thing is tolerance for diversity and for those who are different from us. Being different should not mean being inferior, superior or hostile to the other. We must project Islam in the right spirit, emphasising the practice of tolerance it so ardently advocates to the faithful.

From other hand , Modernism seems to be , in a way, A quite intolerant of forces of tradition or even anything supra-rational, let alone irrational. It was for this reason that Freud's theory of the subconscious or unconscious was also ridiculed by modernists. It was not deemed to be in conformity with reason. Even Marxists also rejected Freud and his explanation of deeper sources of human behaviour. Naturally they also rejected religion as something irrational. Thus, modernism was as intolerant of anything non-modern as one religion is said to be of another.

Europe throughout the 19th century was characterised by modernism and Asia and Africa were looked down upon by the Europeans as anti-modern and irrational. Thus, the 19th century was the century of modernism and of European hegemony. It was in the early 1950s and '60s that new trends began to emerge and post-modernism began to be theorised by academics and social scientists.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

References and further reading

 

·    Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914. Oxford and New York, 1969.

·    Alan Bloom [1] The Repubvlic of Plato – Second Edition translated with notes an interpretive essay

·    Alderson, A. D.The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty. Oxford and New York, 1956.

·    Braude, Benjamin, and Bernard Lewis, eds.Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. 2 vols.New York and London, 1982.

·    Brown, L. Carl, ed.Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East. New York, 1996.

·    Butterworth, C.E. (ed.) (1992) The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (An up-to-date collection of essays on, among others, al-Kindi, al-Razi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd.)

·    Bernard Smith (1998), The Last Days of the Post Mode, Thesis Eleven, Aug 1998; vol. 54: pp. 1 - 23.

 

·    Cahen, Claude. Pre-Ottoman Turkey. London and New York, 1968.

·    Davison, Roderic. Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876. Princeton, N.J., 1963.

·    Deringil, Selim. The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909. London, 1998.

·    Daiber, H. (1996) 'Political Philosophy', in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds) History of Islamic Philosophy, London: Routledge, ch. 50, 841-85. (Account of some of the main political thinkers from the classical period.)

·    Al-Farabi (c. 870-950) Tahsil al-sa'ada (The Attainment of Happiness), trans. M. Mahdi, Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962. (Translation, with introduction and notes, of Tahsil al-sa'ada and the précis of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.)

·       Falsafa. Breve Introdução à Filosofia Arábico-Islâmica- Autor: Mário Santiago de Carvalho  Estado: Público Nº de páginas: 147

·    Al-Fārābī, Attainment [of Happiness], in Alfarabi, 1962, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. with an intro. by M. Mahdi, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, pp. 13–50 (revised ed. with a foreword by C.E. Butterworth and T.L. Pangle, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 13–50; quotations in this entry are based on this revised edition).

·    Book of Religion, in Alfarabi 2001: 93–113.

·     Enumeration [of the Sciences], Chapter Five (on philosophy of society, jurisprudence, and theology), in Alfarabi 2001: 76–92.

·    Faroqhi, Suraiya, ed.The Cambridge History of Turkey, vol 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839. New York, 2006.

·    Findley, Carter. Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922. Princeton, N.J., 1980.

·    Finkel, Caroline. Osman's Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire. London, 2006.

·    Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and the Early Modern Europe. New York, 2003.

·    Goodwin, Godfrey. History of Turkish Architecture. London, 1972.

·    Hanioglu, Sukru. Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908. Oxford, 2001.

·    Hanioglu, Sukru. The Young Turks in Opposition. Oxford, 1995.

·    Inalcık, Halil. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600. London and New York, 1973.

·    Inalcık, Halil and Donald Quataert, eds.An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914. New York, 1994.

·    Itzkowitz, Norman. Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition. Chicago, 1972.

·    Karpat, Kemal.The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State. Oxford, 2001.

·    Lewis, Bernard.The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 2d ed. London and New York, 1968.

·    McCarthy, Justin.Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire. New York, 1983.

·    McCarthy, Justin.The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to1923. New York, 1997.

·    Mantran, Robert, ed.Histoire de empire Ottoman. Paris, 1989.

·    Mardin, şerif The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. Princeton, N.J., 1962.

·    , Perfect State, in Alfarabi, 1985, On the Perfect State (Mabādiʾa ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍilah), revised text with intro., trans., and comm. by R. Walzer, Oxford: Clarendon Press (reprint 1998; quotations in this entry are based on this reprint).

·    Political Regime, in Alfarabi, 2015, The Political Writings: “Political Regime” and “Summary of Plato’s Laws”, trans. and annot. by C.E. Butterworth, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 27–94.

·     Selected Aphorisms, in Alfarabi 2001: 11–67.

·    Commentary, in Al-Fārābī, 1981, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s “De Interpretatione”, trans. with an intr. and notes by F.W. Zimmermann, Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press (reprinted with corrections 1991, pp. 1–219; references in this entry are to this reprint).

·    2001, The Political Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Ot

·    Baffioni, C., 2002, “Al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah, in al-Fārābī and in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ: A Comparison”, in Studies in Arabic and Islam: Proceedings of the 19th Congress, Halle 1998, S. Leder (ed.), Leuven et al.: Peeters, pp. 3–12.

·    Black, D.L., 1990, Logic and Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” and “Poetics” in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Leiden and Boston: Brill.

·    Books Abdulaziz, Al-Omair Ali. The Arabian Gulf, University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1980. Abir, Mordechai. Oil, Power and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, The Red Sea and the Gulf. Frank Cass and Company Ltd., Portland, Oregon, 1974. Almond, A. Gabriel. Political Development, Essays in Heuristic Theory, Little, Brown and Company, 1970. Anabtawi, M. F. Arab Unity in Terms of Law. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,

·    Burrell, D., 2013, “From al-Fārābī to Mulla Ṣadrā: The Two Phases of Islamic Philosophical Theology”, in Philosophy and the Abrahamic Religions: Scriptural Hermeneutics and Epistemology, T. Kirby, R. Acar, and B. Bas (eds.), Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 279–295

·    Butterworth, C.E., 1991, “Al-Farabi’s Statecraft: War and the Well-Ordered Regime”, in Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, J.T. Johnson and J. Kelsay (eds.), New York, NY: Greenwood Press, pp. 79–100.

·    2008, “What Might We Learn from al-Fārābī about Plato and Aristotle with Respect to Lawgiving?”, Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph, 61: 471–489.

·    2011, “Alfarabi’s Goal: Political Philosophy, Not Political Theology”, in Afsaruddin 2011: 53–74.

·    2013, “Law and the Common Good: To Bring about a Virtuous City or Preserve the Old Order”, in Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and the Theory of Statecraft, M. Boroujerdi (ed.), Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, pp. 218–239.

·    Campanini, M., 2011, “Alfarabi and the Foundation of Political Theology in Islam”, in Afsaruddin 2011: 35–52.

·    Çevik, M., 2010, “Farabi’s Utopia and Its Eschatological Relations”, Journal of Islamic Research, 3 (2): 173–178.

·    Crone, P., 2004, “Al-Fārābī’s Imperfect Constitutions”, Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph, 57: 191–228

·    Daiber, H., 1986, “Prophetie und Ethik bei Fārābī”, in L’homme et son univers au moyen âge, vol. 2, C. Wenin (ed.), Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, pp. 729–753.

·    Druart, T.-A., 1997, “Al-Fārābī, Ethics, and First Intelligibles”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 8: 403–423.

·    El-Rayes, W.M., 2013, “The Book of Religion’s Political and Pedagogical Objectives”, Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, 40 (2): 175–197.

·    Frank, D. (1996) ' Ethics', in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds) History of Islamic Philosophy, London: Routledge, ch. 55, 959-68. (The ethics of the classical period, with particular reference to their links with society.)

·    Galston, M. (1990) Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Al-Farabi, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Al-Farabi's political philosophy against the backdrop of the Greek philosophical tradition.)

·    Habib, S. Irfan (2000), Reconciling science with Islam in 19th century India, Contributions to Indian Sociology, Feb 2000; vol. 34: pp. 63 - 92.

·     Ibn Rushd (c.1174) Commentary on Plato's Republic, ed. and trans. E.I.J. Rosenthal, Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; trans. R. Lerner, Averroes on Plato's Republic, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974. (Rosenthal is an edition of extant Hebrew text, with introduction, translation and notes. Lerner is a translation with introduction and notes, in part critical of Rosenthal.)

·    Ibn Tufayl (before 1185) Hayy ibn Yaqzan (The Living Son of the Vigilant), trans. L.E. Goodman, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzan, Los Angeles, CA: Gee Tee Bee, 1983. (A felicitous translation of the tale, with introduction and notes.)

·    Leaman, O. (1980) 'Ibn Bajja on Society and Philosophy', Der Islam 57 (1): 109-19. (Ibn Bajja's political philosophy.)

·    Leaman, O. (1988) Averroes and His Philosophy, 2nd edn, Richmond: Curzon. (A recent study of Ibn Rushd's metaphysics, practical philosophy, and theory of language and truth.)

·    Lerner, R. and Mahdi, M. (eds) (1963) Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Important collection of primary texts in translation, including al-Farabi's al-Siyasa al-madaniyya (The Political Regime) and Tahsil al-sa'ada, Ibn Bajja's Tadbir al-mutawahhid, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzan and Ibn Rushd's Fasl al-maqal.)

·    1991, “The Ismaili Background of Fārābī’s Political Philosophy: Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī as a Forerunner of Fārābī”, in Gottes ist der Orient: Gottes ist der Okzident, U. Tworuschka (ed.), Köln and Wien: Böhlau, pp. 143–150.

·    Mahdi, M. (1991) 'Philosophy and Political Thought: Reflections and Comparisons', Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 1: 9-29. (A fine overview of the nature of political philosophy in Islam.)

·    Rosenthal, E.I.J. (1962) Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (The most comprehensive account in English. Part II is entitled 'The Platonic Legacy'.)

·    Wallach, Bologh & Mell, Leonard (1994), Modernism, Postmodernism, and the New World (Dis)order: A Dialectical Analysis and Alternative, Critical Sociology, Jan 1994; vol. 20: pp. 81 - 120. Post Modernism, an article at wikipedia.

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[1] The future of political islam graham e. Fuller

[2] The Repubvlic of Plato – Second Edition translated with notes an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom

[3] The New Tolerance: How a Cultural Movement Threatens to Destroy You, Your Faith, and Your Children.by Josch Macdowel & Bob Hosteler - Published September 1st 1998 by Tyndale House Publishers